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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
CATE RENTAL COMPANY, INC.
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

Case No. 14292

WHALEN & COMPANY,
Defendant-Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit by plaintiff for breach of a
rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant and
for damages resulting from defendant's negligent operation of plaintiff's rental equipment*
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The district judge granted an Order of Dismissal in favor of defendant on the grounds that defendant is a foreign corporation and had not transacted
business within Utah so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts under § 78-27-24 U.C.A.
(1969).
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the
Order of Dismissal below on the grounds that the defendant has transacted business within the State of Utah
and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts
under § 78-27-24 U.C.A. (1969).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are essentially uncontroverted.

Plaintiff transacted business with defendant

on a continuous basis for more than ten years prior to
the transaction at issue in the instant case. The business transacted between the parties involved the purchase
or lease of various mining and construction equipment
for which defendant paid plaintiff many thousands of
dollars.

Defendant through its president, Jerry Whalen,

contacted plaintiff's sales representatives in regard to
the purchase or lease of miscellaneous mining and construction equipment on the average of five times a year.
Plaintiff would accept defendant's offers to purchase
or lease certain equipment, and would thereupon ship
the equipment FOB its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah to
the location designated by defendant.

Plaintiff would

thereafter send an invoice to defendant's office confirming the transaction and defendant would send to
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It is declared, as a matter of legislative
determination, that the public interest
demands the state provide its citizens with
an effective means of redress against nonresident persons, who through certain significant minimal contacts with this state,
incur obligations to citizens entitled to
the state's protection. This legislative
action is deemed necessary because of
technological progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting in
increased interaction between persons
of this state and persons of other states.
The provisions of this act, to ensure
maximum protection to citizens of this
state, should be applied so as to assert
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
to the fullest extent permitted by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This section clearly demonstrates the Utah Legislature's
determination that resident plaintiffs are to be afforded
effective redress against nonresidents in Utah courts so
long as vesting jurisdiction does not violate due process.
The issue then in this case is whether defendant engaged
in any "transaction of business within this state,"
§ 78-27-24(1) such that maintenance of jurisdiction "does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

International Shoe Co. v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877),
there has been a clear trend to expand state court jurisdiction over nonresidents.

In International Shoe Co. v.
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Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme Court
established the minimum contacts rule for the basis of
state jurisdiction, to the extent "that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.1"

326 U.S. at 316.

Subsequently, the Court in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), seemingly eliminated
most limitations upon state court jurisdiction in holding that California had jurisdiction over a foreign
insurance company whose sole contact with the state was
a single life insurance contract upon the life of plaintiff's decedent.

The following year in Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235 (1958) the Court, however, reaffirmed the
necessity of minimum contacts in declaring, "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state . . . " 357
U.S. at 253.
These Supreme Court cases discuss three relevant criteria for determining the constitutional outerlimits of in personam jurisdiction:
First, the defendant must purposefully
avail himself of the privilege of acting
in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the
cause of action must arise from the
defendant's activities there. Finally,

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the acts of the defendant or consequences
caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum
state to make the exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant reasonable. Southern
Machine Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.,
401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968).
For a similar approach to the problem of in personam
jurisdiction, See, L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona
v. Higgins Industries, 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959);
Aftanese v. Economy Baler Company, 343 F.2d 187 (8th
Cir. 1965)? Curtis Publishing Company v. T. B. Birdsong,
360 F.2d 344, 352-353 (5th Cir. 1966) (Rives, J. concurring) ; Hill v. Smith, 337 F.Supp 981 (W. D. Mich.
1972); Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products,
Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).

In instances

where those three criteria are satisfied, in personam
jurisdiction may be constitutionally recognized even
on the basis of a single act. Applying these criteria
to the instant case, the District Court erred in dismissing the Complaint based upon lack of jurisdiction.
A.
THE DEFENDANT PURPOSEFULLY AVAILED
ITSELF OF THE PRIVILEGE OF ACTING
OR CAUSING CONSEQUENCE IN THE FORUM
STATE.
1. Defendant's physical presence is not a constitutional requirement for recognizing jurisdiction where
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege
of acting or causing consequence in the forum state.

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant
asserts that it has no office or place of business,
directory listing, warehouse or inventory in the State
of Utah, that it owns no real or personal property in the
State of Utah, that it does not maintain any subsidiary,
employee, salesman, agent, distributorship, or representative in the State of Utah and that it never came into the
State of Utah in connection with the contract at issue
in this case.
While it is not disputed that physical presence
as evidenced by any of the above-mentioned circumstances
are important indicia of significant contacts justifying
the recognition of jurisdiction, such presence is not
necessary nor conclusive of the issue of whether or not
recognizing jurisdiction would violate due process.
Although such factors of actual physical presence are
important, nearly every jurisdiction has changed the
focus, in at least those instances involving commercial
dealings, and consider whether or not the defendant is
present in a business rather than necessarily a physical
sense.

In McGraw v. Matthaei, 340 F.Supp. 162 (E.D.

Mich. 1972), for example, the court criticized defendant's
reliance on the fact that he was never physically present
in the state.
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Defendant has placed great emphasis on
the fact that he was not physically
present in the state when he executed
the note. This court is of the opinion
that one need not be physically present
in the state to "transact business within the state,"
Modern technology has taken us far beyond
the point where two men must stand in
each other's physical presence to transact business. Widespread use of the telephone and the mails make actual physical
presence unnecessary in many cases . . . .
For all practical purposes transactions
accomplished with such devices have the
same effect as if the two men had been in
each other's physical presence. 340 F.Supp at 164.
To the same effect, the court in O'Hare International
437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971) held that personal jurisdiction does not require the physical presence of the
defendant within the state:
/personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant does not depend upon the physical
presence of the defendant within the state.
It is sufficient that the act or transaction itself has a substantial connection
with the forum state. 437 F.2d at 1175.
The test then that has replaced actual presence
in the state is whether the party has purposefully transacted business having substantial consequences within
the forum.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the
"purposeful activity" requirement, as compared to stressing factors of physical presence, in a number of cases.
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In Mack Financial Corporation v. Nevada Motor Rentals,
Inc.,

Utah 2d

, 529 P.2d 429 (1974),

for example, defendant's trucks, purchased pursuant to
a conditional sales contract from plaintiff's assignor,
were driven over Utah highways, and, therefore, defendant was physically present within the forum.

The con-

tracts and assignments incident to the sales in that
case, however, had been executed in Colorado and the
defendant had not purposefully transacted business within the forum.

Consequently, the court held that Utah

courts had no jurisdiction over defendant.
in Pellegrini v. Sachs and Sons,

Similarly,

Utah 2d

,

522 P.2d 704 (1974) the court discussed the purposeful
activity requirement of Hanson v. Denckla, supra, as the
critical jurisdictional issue. There plaintiff brought
a product's liability action against a California automobile dealer and Ford Motor Company for damages arising
out of breach of warranty.

In concluding that the Utah

courts had no jurisdiction over the California dealer
who had sold the automobile to plaintiff but who had not
purposefully transacted business within the State of Utah,
the court asserted that,
Plaintiff must nevertheless show that
the defendant, by himself or agent,
engaged in some substantial activity
which constitutes a purposeful minimum
contact with this state upon which to
predicate jurisdiction of our courts.
522 P.2d at 708.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Again in Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan,
Utah 2d

#

526 P.2d 1186 (1974) the court held

that the defendant did not purposefully engage in business in Utah where he merely procured an insurance
policy from a Utah corporation through an agent in
Idaho.

Finally, the court in Hanks v. Administrator

of the Estate of Jensen,

Utah 2d

_f

531 P.2d 363 (1974) held that the Utah courts had no
jurisdiction where defendant had not purposefully transacted business within the state, but only had been
appointed as Administrator of an estate:
The rationale of statutes and the
decisional law in the trend toward
extending jurisdiction over foreign
residents is that there must be some
intentional and purposeful activity of
the defendant in the forum state by
which he takes advantage of the benefits
and protections of its laws, and is
obliged reciprocally to submit to its
remedies. 531 P.2d at 364.
In comparison, where the nonresident defendant
has purposefully acted within the state, the Utah Supreme
Court has recognized jurisdiction.

In Hill v. Zale,

25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971) the court asserted
that where a nonresident corporation has enjoyed the
benefits of having purposefully carried on business
within the state, jurisdiction is proper:
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When a foreign corporation is permitted
to enjoy the advantages of having activities carried on within a state to further
its business interests under the protection of its laws, it is only fair and
reasonable that its citizens have some
practical means of redress if grievances
arise. jEd. at 334.
The Court followed a similar line of reasoning in
Foreign Study League v. Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d
447, 497 P.2d 244 (1972).

There defendant's purposeful

activities within the forum included sales and sales
promotion within the state by "independent nonexclusive
sales representatives" together with two visits to Utah
by defendant's agents. This purposeful activity was
held by the court to satisfy constitutional standards
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had no
stores or offices in Utah, as well as no employees or
personnel in Utah. lei. at 249

(Crockett, J. dissenting )..

In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has
consistently applied the Mpurposeful activity" approach
in analyzing jurisdiction.

In those cases where the

nonresident defendant has not purposefully transacted
business within the state, the court has refused jurisdiction; even in those instances where defendant had
been physically present in the state.

On the other hand

where the nonresident defendant has purposefully transacted business within the state, the court has recognized

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jurisdiction on the basis of that business presence,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendants actual
physical presence may be limited to a few visits to
Utah for combined "business and social" purposes.
In support of its position, defendant asserts
that while it purposefully transacted business having
substantial consequence within the forum, its actual
contacts were either by phone or mail.
A contract entered into by phone or mail is
recognized as sufficient "presence" to justify vesting
jurisdiction:
It is important to emphasize that one
need not be physically present in order
to be subject to the jurisdiction of our
courts under /the Forum's Long-Arm
Statute/ for, particularly in this day
of instant long-range communications,
one can engage in extensive purposeful
activity here without ever actually
setting foot in the state . . . . Any
implication, in older cases, that physical presence was a necessary factor in
obtaining jurisdiction over nonresidents
was expressly rejected by the Supreme
Court in the International Shoe case . . . .
The terms "present" and "presence" are
used merely to symbolize those activities . . .
which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process. ParkeBernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn,26 N.Y.2d
13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1970)
A contract entered, into by phone alone may be
sufficient to vest jurisdiction:

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Again it must be emphasized that no particular type of physical contact is required
as a jurisdictional prerequisite. A letter
or a telephone call may, in a given situation,
be as indicative of substantial involvement
with the forum state as a personal visit by
the defendant or its agents. In-Flight Devices
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 235
(6th Cir. 1972)
~~
A similar conclusion was reached in State ex rel White
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448
P.2d 571 (1968).

There a contract was entered into

by phone and later confirmed in writing by mail.

The

court in that case found jurisdiction to lie despite
the fact that defendant had not physically been present
in the forum:
The pending litigation clearly lies: in the
wake of the order which /defendant/ placed
with /plaintiff^7. Whether or not "title
passed," the telephone order produced
substantial business consequences in /The
foruny7. Written confirmation merely reenforced the order. Physical presence
within the forum is not necessary to the
existence of a tort within the state . . . .
On the score of physical presence there is
no substantial reason for distinguishing
business transactions from personal injuries.
448 P.2d 573.
Further responding to defendant's contention that
recognizing jurisdiction on such a tenuous basis as a
contract entered into over the phone, would violate
due process, the court concluded to the contrary that
recognizing jurisdiction would not violate constitutional standards:

-13-
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Unfairness inconsistent with notions of fair
play occurs only when a defendant is "compelled
to defend himself in a court of a State with
which he has no relevant connection."
In the case at bar, both parties are . . .
engaged in interstate commerce. Both parties
used conventional and well-understood methods
of communicating offers and acceptances . . . •
It is clear that the placing of the telephoned
order had effects, or "significant contacts,"
in /the forum/. 448 P.2d at 574 (quoting
Judge FriendTy).
To the same effect is Griffiths & Sprague Stevedoring Go.
v. Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc., 430 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1967).
There the court recognized jurisdiction on the basis of
a single phone call by the nonresident to the forum,
despite the fact that the contract was ultimately executed abroad:
The connecting link then may consist of
affirmative acts taking place here by
which the out-of-state resident overtly
submits to jurisdiction (Quigley v. Spano
Crane Sale & Serv., Inc., 70 Wash Dec. 2d
193, 422 P.2d 512 (1967))7 or the initiation of a transaction outside the state in
contemplation that some phase of it will
take place in the forum state (Nixon v.
Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963)). . . .
The existence of these phenomena of modern
economy are ordinarily enough to bring the
parties within the long-arm statute without
engendering an unjust or oppressive extension of jurisdiction. 422 P.2d at 603.
The court further commented:

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When /defendant/7 ordered insurance by
telephone and mail from or through
/plaintiff/ it overtly performed acts
making it a party to and participant
in a business transaction in /the
forum/, even though it was contemplated by /defendant/ that the insurer
might be a foreign agency. 422 P.2d
at 604.
These cases then can be distinguished from the
typical "mail order" situation, where the buyer is
relatively a passive party who simply places an order
in response to the initiatory efforts of the seller.
In cases involving commercial dealings, the nonresidents
are generally not "'passive purchasers1 being unsuspectingly and unfairly dragged into a foreign forum."

M & W

Contractors Inc v. Arch Mineral Corporation, 466 F.2d
1339, 1340 (6th Cir. 1972); See also In-Flight Devices
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., supra. The theory of these
cases then is that physical presence, although significant, is not the primary determinant in considering jurisdiction.

The focus should instead be on whether or

not the nonresident so purposefully acted as to knowingly cause consequences within the forum:
That a defendant did not perform a
physical act within the /forum7 is
not determinative of his or her lack
of "minimum contact," for activities
outside the state resulting in consequences within the state may subject
those involved in such activities to
in personam jurisdiction of the courts
of the state. Hamilton Nat'l Bank of
Chattanooga v. Russell, 261 F. Supp 145 (1966).
-15-
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The contact-producing activity within
this state made by a nonresident has
to be neither extensive nor physical,
so long as the suit arises from at
least some of those and the impact
in this state of the nonresident's
activity is foreseeable. Int'l Sales
and Lease v. Seven Bar Flying Service,
Inc.,
Wash. App.
, 533
P.2d 445 (1975).
Thus, a single phone call or contact by
mail may be sufficient to constitutionally establish
jurisdiction where either is intended to cause significant consequences within the forum state:
Although defendant's only contact
within this state was a telephone
call, that call was all that was
necessary for defendant to achieve
its purpose. Cook Ass'n Inc. v.
Colonial Broach & Machinery Co.,
14 111. App.3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27
(1973).
A letter or a telephone call may, in
a given situation, be as indicative
of substantial involvement with the
forum state as a personal visit by
the defendant or its agents. In-Flight
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc.,
644 F.2d 220, 235 (6th Cir. 1972).
And as with In-Flight Devices, supra, and Cook Ass'n,
Inc., supra, defendant in this case was aware that
its making of a contract with plaintiff would affect
the forum state:

"/t/hat the making (and breaking)

of a contract with the Plaintiff would have substantial consequence with the /forum7 is a reality of
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which Defendant could not have been ignorant." 466
F.2d at 227. In this sense, defendant's contacts by
mail and phone in this case constitute the business
equivalent of physical "presence,"

(Murphy v. Erwin-

Wasey, Inc., 460 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1972)) and recognizing jurisdiction under such circumstances is constitutionally valid:
For the purposes of ("general fairness"),
business is transacted in a state when
obligations created by the defendant or
business operations set in motion by
the defendant have a realistic impact
on the commerce of that state . . . .
Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries,
Inc., 401 F.2d at 382.
2. Defendant's presence in this State in
connection with its course of dealings with plaintiff
is sufficient to vest jurisdiction.
While it is clear that physical presence is
not necessary for the court to vest jurisdiction, the
undisputed facts in this case are that Jerry Whalen as
President of Whalen and Company came to Utah and met
with plaintiff's sales representatives at plaintiff's
place of business in regard to their business dealings.
Such presence by defendant's president for the purpose
of discussing the possibility of further dealings between
the parties, clearly is sufficient "physical presence"

-17-
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to vest jurisdiction on that basis alone*

In Delta

Equities v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 133 Ga. App.
382, 211 S.E.2d 9 (1975)f for example, defendant made
two visits to the state in connection with the negotiation of a contract with plaintiff.

The court, under

those circumstances, upheld jurisdiction on the basis
of those minimal contacts.
/W7e are not unmindful that the trend
of the opinions is to construe longarm "transacting any business" statutes
most liberally and to uphold the jurisdiction of the court of the plaintiffs
residence in actions, arising either
directly or indirectly, out of such
transactions. 211 S.E.2d at 11.
Similarly, in Harry Winston, Inc. v. Waldfagel, 292
F. Supp 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), two visits by defendant to
a New York store in connection with contract negotiations
was held sufficient to constitute "transacting any business," even though the contract was executed over the
phone and the subject matter of the contract was delivered
by mail.

To the same effect, see, Tatham-Laird & Kudner,

Inc. v. Johnny's American Inn Inc., 383 F.Supp 28 (N.D.
111. 1974); Doyn Aircraft, Inc. v. Wylie, 443 F.2d 579
(10th Cir. 1971); Karlin v. Avis, 326 F.Supp 1325
(E.D.N.Y. 1971); Hill v. Smith, 337 F.Supp. 981 (W.D.
Mich. 1972).

On that basis, this case is not unlike
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Foreign Study League v. Holland-America Line, 27 Utah 2d
442, 497 P.2d 244 (1972).

There defendant had conducted

business through sales promotion by "independent nonexclusive sales representative," had corresponded by
mail and telephone with the plaintiff in connection with
such sales promotion and on two occasions its agents
had combined "social and business" visits to Utah. The
Utah Supreme Court held those contacts sufficient to
vest jurisdiction.
In addition to the actual presence of Jerry
Whalen in the forum for the purpose of conducting business
with plaintiff, defendant in each business transaction,
purchased or leased the equipment from plaintiff FOB
plaintiff's offices in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Accordingly,

defendant's agent was present in Utah in connection with
each business transaction entered into between the
parties for the purpose of "picking up" the equipment.
The facts in the instant case with respect to defendant's
"picking up" of the equipment purchased or leased from
plaintiff are similar to those in Mcintosh v. Navaro Seed
Company, 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970).

Jurisdiction

in Mcintosh was recognized on the basis of an "isolated
transaction" where defendant purchased seed grain from
plaintiff by telephone and later picked up the purchased
grain at plaintiff's place of business. To the same
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effect is Wickman v. Hughs, 248 Ark, 121, 450 S.W.2d
294 (1970).

There defendant purchased horses, leaving

the seller with a check which later was returned for
insufficient funds. The court held jurisdictional
requirements of "transacting business11 were met by such
acts.

Similarly, in Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v.

Superior Court, 323 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1958), Justice
Traynor upheld jurisdiction where the products purchased by the nonresident defendant were sold FOB plaintiff's place of business in California.

Justice Traynor

there concluded that since title to goods was transferred
in California, pursuant to the FOB arrangement, defendant
was "doing business" in California.

See also, Crusader

Marine Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 281 F.Supp. 802 (E.D.
Mich. 1968).
In conclusion, the district court in the instant
case improperly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on two basis. First, actual physical presence is
not a constitutional prerequisite to recognizing jurisdiction where the nonresident defendant has made his
commercial presence manifest within the forum through
a course of business dealings by mail and phone. Second,
defendant in this case has actually been present in this
state and has transacted business within the state.
Jerry Whalen met with plaintiff's sales personnel at

-20-
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their offices in Salt Lake City on at least one occasion
in 1973, and defendant's agent was present in the state
in each instance where defendant purchased or leased
equipment FOB from plaintiff, for the purpose of "picking
up" the equipment.

Thus defendant has purposefully

transacted business within the state so as to fall within the holding of the court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958):
It is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws.

B.
THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE INSTANT CASE
AROSE OUT OF THE PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES ENTERED INTO BY DEFENDANT
WITH PLAINTIFF.
The cause of action in the instant case involves
obligations created by the rental lease agreement between
plaintiff and defendant. Whalen's participation in
establishing those obligations and in setting in motion
the lease of the Allis-Chalmers front-end loader is undisputed.

The front loader was leased FOB plaintiff's yard

in Salt Lake City, Utah, at defendant's initiation and
delivered per defendant's instructions to J. Whalen as
consignee in Billings, Montana.

-21-
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as a matter of normal business practice confirmed the
lease transaction by mailing an invoice to defendant
following defendant's ordering of the equipment.
Nor was this a solitary transaction but instead
arose out of a long term and continuous business relationship between the parties.

Defendant had trans-

acted similar lease agreements with plaintiff for
heavy equipment on at least two previous occasions.
Similarly, Jerry Whalen as president of Whalen and
Company had made numerous sales transactions by phone
with plaintiff involving miscellaneous mining and drilling equipment over a period in excess of ten years, and
involving many thousands of dollars.
As has been previously discussed, most of these
sales transactions were entered into by phone and confirmed by mail.

Invoices were in each case mailed from

Cate Equipment in Salt Lake City to Whalen & Company in
Montana, and defendant normally paid for such purchases
or leases by mailing checks to plaintiff's office in
Salt Lake City.

Furthermore, the course of dealing was

initiated by defendant in an effort to serve its operative needs.

In essence, the facts of this case are

comparable to those in Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 323 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1958).

There defen-

dant purchased products from plaintiff over a two year
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period.

In concluding that such regular sales trans-

actions can render a foreign corporation amenable to
the jurisdiction of the forum, Justice Traynor pointed
out that the alleged cause of action grew directly out
of defendant's continuous business relation with plaintiff, and as a result jurisdiction would properly lie
in the forum.

323 P.2d at 437.

The facts in this case distinguish it from
those cases where the Utah Supreme Court has denied
jurisdiction because the cause of action did not arise
out of the defendant's activities within the state. In
Mack Financial Corporation v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc.,
Utah 2d

, 529 P.2d 429 (1974), for

example, the defendant's activities within the state
primarily involved defendant's use of the state highways, whereas the cause of action involved a contractual
obligation.

Similarly, in Hanks v. Administrator of

the Estate of Jensen,

Utah 2d

, 531

P.2d 363 (1974), defendant's activities within the
state involved defendant's administration of an estate
within Utah, whereas his cause of action involved
damages arising out of an automobile accident in California.

These cases, as distinguished from the instant

case, were properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
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in that plaintiff's cause of action did not arise out
of defendant's activities within the state.
The instant case, in comparison, involves a
cause of action arising out of defendant's purposeful
business transactions within the State of Utah and
meets the second criteria for constitutionally upholding jurisdiction.
C
•;

DEPENDANT'S ACTS AND THE RESULTING
QUENCES CAUSED BY SUCH ACTS HAVE A
STANTIAL CONNECTION WITH THE FORUM
SUCH THAT RECOGNIZING JURISDICTION
BE REASONABLE AND FAIR.

CONSESUBSTATE,
WOULD

The final issue involved is whether the State
of Utah has an interest in resolving the conflict at
issue, and whether such interest is consistent with the
requirements ,of due process.

In this case the court is

aided somewhat by the express declaration of Utahfs
Legislature, that it is in the State's interest to afford
resident plaintiffs effective redress against nonresidents in any cause of action arising from any business
transaction substantially affecting Utah residents. A
commercial contract with a resident plaintiff clearly
constitutes "transacting business within the state" and
fairly provides the basis of jurisdiction:
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Thus, where jurisdiction prior to enactment
of the long-arm statute . . . formerly
depended on doing business as a more or
less continuous concept such as maintaining offices, agents, and performing contracts in the routine and regular course
of business within the forum state or
involved activities showing a continuing
course of conduct, now a solitary business
deal, if transacted within this state will,
suffice to vest jurisdiction . . . ."
Quigley v. Spano Sales and Service, 70 Wash
Dec. 2d 193, 422 P.2d 512, 514 (Wash. 1967).
It is, therefore, especially true in this case where
the contract was not a "one-shot1* affair.

The contract

at issue was but an instance of a continuous business
relation that existed between plaintiff and defendant,
from which defendant profited.

And as the court in

Southern Machine Company, supra,suggested, n/l7t cannot
complain if along with the profits from the /forum7
market it must also accept the process from the /foruny7
courts." 401 F.2d at 386.
The United States Supreme Court has held that
jurisdiction may be constitutionally recognized where a
party has benefitted from activities affecting residents
of the forum state:
But to the extent that a corporation exercises
the privilege of conducting activities with a
state, it enjoys the benefits and protection
of the laws of that state. The exercise of
that privilege may give use to obligations;
and, so far as those obligations arise out
of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires
the corporation to respond to a suit brought
to enforce them can, in most instances,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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hardly be said to be undue.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
The approach outlined in International Shoe, supra, was
followed by Justice Traynor in Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 1323 P.2d 437 (Cal. 1958).

In that

case, Justice Traynor held that where a nonresident
seller had made regular purchases of goods FOB the
resident-seller's place of business in California,
defendant was constitutionally amenable to suit in California:
Whenever litigation arises out of business
transactions conducted across state lines
between parties whose physical places of
business are in different states, there
may be hardship to the party required to
litigate away from home. There is no
constitutional requirement, however,
that this hardship must invariably be
borne by the plaintiff whenever the defendant is not deemed present in the state
of plaintiff's residence. In some cirr cumstances there is adequate basis for
jurisdiction when the defendant has
elected to deal with the plaintiff even
though by mail. McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 78 S.Ct. 199, 201.
323 P.2d at 440.
And as with the transaction involved in Henry R. Jahn,
supra, Whalen & Co. in the instant case leased the
equipment FOB Salt Lake City, and, therefore, took
title to the goods in this state. Accordingly, "/T7t
reaped the benefits of our laws that protected its goods
while they were here, and it had access to our courts
to enforce any rights in regard to these transactions."
**^o

T%
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The same reasoning was followed in State ex rel White
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 448 P.2d
571 (1968):
One who regularly engages in
interstate business subjects himself
to the possible inconvenience of litigating in other states concerning the
business there transacted. Anyone who
either buys or sells nationally transacts
business in the state of both the buyer
and the seller. The fairness involved is
really determined by the convenience of
the litigants. If it is convenient to
transact business it is not so inconvenient to litigate as to be unfair. 448
P.2d at 574 (Holman, J. concurring).
The Utah Supreme Court also has followed the
reasoning of International Shoe, Inc., supra, and McGee,
supra.

In upholding jurisdiction on the basis of the

"long-arm" statutes, the Utah Supreme Court in Hill v.
Zale, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971) stated:
when a formed corporation is permitted
to enjoy the advantages of having activities carried on within a state to further
its business interest under the protections
of its laws, it is only fair and reasonable
that its citizens have some practical means
of redress if grievances arise.
482 P.2d at 333, 334.
The Court further suggested that while the nonresident
defendant may be inconvenienced by having to defend the
cause of action in this state, "the hardship or inconvenience to a plaintiff should also be given consideration. " 482 P.2d at 335.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant has transacted business within the
forum state so as to be within the purview of Utah's
Long-Arm Statute, § 78-27-24 U.C.A. (1969).

The defen-

dant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
acting and causing consequence in the forum state*
Furthermore, the cause of action involving a contractual
claim arose out of defendant's purposeful activities
with plaintiff within the forum.

Consequently, recogniz-

ing jurisdiction under these facts is reasonable and does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice*
The court below, therefore, erred in granting
defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted,
/•
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R. COLLIN MANGRUM
^
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER,
JENSEN & EVANS
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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